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On the Consequences of the US Withdrawal from the Kyoto/Bonn Protocol

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  • Buchner, Barbara
  • Carraro, Carlo
  • Cersosimo, Igor

Abstract

The US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the recent outcomes of the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences of the Parties has important implications for both the effectiveness and the efficiency of future climate policies. Among these implications, those related with technical change and with the functioning of the international market for carbon emissions are particularly relevant, because these variables have the largest impact on the overall abatement cost to be born by Annex B countries in the short and in the long run. This Paper analyses the consequences of the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto/Bonn Protocol both on technological innovation and on the price of emission permits (and, as a consequence, on abatement costs). A first goal is to assess the impact of the US defection on the price of permits and compliance costs when technological innovation and diffusion is taken into account (the model embodies international technological spillovers). A second goal is to understand for what reasons in the presence of endogenous and induced technical change the reduction of the price of permits is lower than in most empirical analyses recently circulated. A third goal is to assess the role of Russia in climate negotiations, its increased bargaining power and its eventual incentives to follow the US defections.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3239.

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Date of creation: Mar 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3239

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Keywords: agreements; climate; incentives; negotiations; policy;

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References

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  1. Paul Romer, 1991. "Endogenous Technological Change," NBER Working Papers 3210, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Johan Eyckmans & Denise Van Regemorter & Vincent van Steenberghe, 2001. "Is Kyoto fatally flawed? An analysis with MacGEM," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0118, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
  3. Nordhaus, William D & Yang, Zili, 1996. "A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 741-65, September.
  4. Alan S. Manne & Richard G. Richels, 1999. "The Kyoto Protocol: A Cost-Effective Strategy for Meeting Environmental Objectives?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I), pages 1-23.
  5. Eyckmans, Johan & Tulkens, Henry, 2003. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 299-327, October.
  6. M. Galeotti & A. Lanza, 1999. "Desperately seeking (environmental) Kuznets," Working Paper CRENoS 199901, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  7. Goulder, Lawrence H. & Mathai, Koshy, 2000. "Optimal CO2 Abatement in the Presence of Induced Technological Change," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-38, January.
  8. Böhringer, Christoph, 2001. "Climate politics from Kyoto to Bonn: from little to nothing?!?," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-49, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  9. Buonanno, Paolo & Carraro, Carlo & Galeotti, Marzio, 2003. "Endogenous induced technical change and the costs of Kyoto," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 11-34, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Christoph Bohringer & Heinz Welsch, 2006. "Burden sharing in a greenhouse: egalitarianism and sovereignty reconciled," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(9), pages 981-996.
  2. Barbara Buchner & Carlo Carraro & Igor Cersosimo & Carmen Marchiori, 2002. "Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage between R&D and Climate Cooperation," CESifo Working Paper Series 688, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Bjart J. Holtsmark & Knut H. Alfsen, 2004. "Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol without Russian participation," Discussion Papers 376, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
  4. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "Regional and sub-global climate blocs. A game-theoretic perspective on bottom-up climate regimes," Working Papers 2006_10, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  5. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol," Working Papers 2006_12Classification-JEL, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  6. Bernard, A. & Haurie, A. & Vielle, M. & Viguier, L., 2008. "A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia, China, and Annex B countries," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1830-1856, June.
  7. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2003. "China and the Evolution of the Present Climate Regime," Working Papers 2003.103, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  8. Barbara Buchner & Marzio Galeotti, 2003. "Climate Policy and Economic Growth in Developing Countries," Working Papers 2003.91, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  9. Frank Biermann & Rainer Brohm, 2005. "Border Adjustments on Energy Taxes: A Possible Tool for European Policymakers in Implementing the Kyoto Protocol?," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 74(2), pages 249-258.
  10. Christoph BOhringer & Andreas LOschel, 2003. "Market power and hot air in international emissions trading: the impacts of US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(6), pages 651-663.

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