Explaining Leakage of Public Funds
AbstractUsing panel data from an unique survey of public primary schools in Uganda we assess the degree of leakage of public funds in education. The survey data reveal that on average, during the period 1991-95, schools received only 13% of what the central government contributed to the schools’ non-wage expenditures. The bulk of the allocated spending was either used by public officials for purposes unrelated to education or captured for private gain (leakage). Moreover, we find that resource flows and leakages are endogenous to schools socio-political endowment. Rather than being passive recipients of flows from government, schools use their bargaining power vis-a-vis other parts of government to secure greater shares of funding. These results have clear implications for research. The survey findings also had a direct impact on policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3227.
Date of creation: Feb 2002
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Other versions of this item:
- Reinikka, Ritva & Svensson, Jakob, 2001. "Explaining Leakage of Public Funds," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Reinikka, Ritva & Svensson, Jakob, 2001. "Explaining leakage of public funds," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2709, The World Bank.
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-03-14 (All new papers)
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- Di Tella, Rafael & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2003. "The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(1), pages 269-92, April.
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