AbstractWe demonstrate how endogenous information acquisition in credit markets creates lending cycles when competing banks undertake their screening decisions in an uncoordinated way, thereby highlighting the role of intertemporal screening externalities induced by lending market competition as a structural source of instability. We show that uncoordinated screening behaviour of competing banks may be not only the source of an important financial multiplier, but also an independent source of fluctuations inducing business cycles. The screening cycle mechanism is robust to generalizations along many dimensions such as the lending market structure, the lending rate determination and the imperfections in the screening technology.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2915.
Date of creation: Aug 2001
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
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