Buyers' Coordination and Entry
AbstractMiscoordination of buyers might prevent entry in an industry with an incumbent and a more efficient potential entrant. Buyers' power therefore favours entry by eliminating coordination problems. We also identify a mechanism which facilitates entry: if the potential entrant could credibly offer to pay a penalty for unfulfilled orders, miscoordination would be eliminated. Without the penalty, we show that downstream competition also facilitates entry. The stronger the competition among buyers the less likely that miscoordination arises.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2908.
Date of creation: Aug 2001
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- Karlinger, Liliane & Motta, Massimo, 2007.
"Exclusionary Pricing and Rebates When Scale Matters,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Liliane Karlinger & Massimo Motta, 2007. "Exclusionary Pricing and Rebates When Scale Matters," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/30, European University Institute.
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