Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans
AbstractThis Paper considers why a manager would choose to submit himself to the discipline of bank monitoring. This issue is analysed within the context of a model where the manager enjoys private benefits, which can be restricted by the monitor, and is optimally compensated by shareholders. Within this setting, we find that managers will submit to monitoring when they receive favourable private information. This result is consistent with event study evidence that suggests that the market has a favourable view of financing choices that increase monitoring.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2643.
Date of creation: Dec 2000
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Other versions of this item:
- Andres Almazan & Javier Suarez, 2003. "Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 16(1), pages 237-261.
- Almazan, A. & Suarez, J., 2001. "Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans," Papers 0103, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
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- Josep Pijoan-Mas, 2006.
"Precautionary Savings or Working Longer Hours?,"
Review of Economic Dynamics,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 326-352, April.
- Josep Pijoan-Mas, 2003. "Precautionary Savings Or Working Longer Hours?," Working Papers wp2003_0311, CEMFI.
- Josep Pijoan-Mas, 2004. "Precautionary Savings or Working Longer Hours?," 2004 Meeting Papers 350, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Pijoan-Mas, Josep, 2005. "Precautionary Savings or Working Longer Hours?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Meneghetti, Costanza, 2012. "Managerial Incentives and the Choice between Public and Bank Debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 65-91.
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