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A Model of Takeovers of Foreign Banks

Author

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  • Repullo, Rafael

Abstract

This Paper investigates the determinants of the takeover of a foreign bank by a domestic bank whereby the former becomes a branch of the latter. Each bank is initially supervised by a national agency that cares about closure costs and deposit insurance payouts, and may decide the early closure of the bank on the basis of supervisory information. Under the principle of home country control, the takeover moves responsibility for both the supervision of the foreign bank and the insurance of the foreign deposits to the domestic agency. It is shown that the takeover is more likely to happen if the foreign bank is small (relative to the foreign banking market) and its investments are risky (relative to those of the domestic bank). Moreover, the takeover is in general welfare improving for both countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Repullo, Rafael, 2000. "A Model of Takeovers of Foreign Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 2639, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2639
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2009_016 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Buch, Claudia M. & DeLong, Gayle, 2004. "Cross-border bank mergers: What lures the rare animal?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 2077-2102, September.
    3. Buch, Claudia M. & DeLong, Gayle, 2008. "Do weak supervisory systems encourage bank risk-taking?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 23-39, April.
    4. Diemo Dietrich & Uwe Vollmer, 2010. "International Banking and Liquidity Allocation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 37(1), pages 45-69, February.
    5. Choi, Sungho & Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2010. "Cross-border bank M&As and risk: evidence from the bond market," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 4/2010, Bank of Finland.
    6. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2007_012 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Josep Pijoan-Mas, 2006. "Precautionary Savings or Working Longer Hours?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 326-352, April.
    8. Morrison, Alan & Lóránth, Gyöngyi, 2003. "Multinational Bank Regulation with Deposit Insurance and Diversification Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 4148, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Cornelia Holthausen & Thomas Rønde, 2003. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CIE Discussion Papers 2004-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    10. Focarelli, Dario & Pozzolo, Alberto Franco, 2008. "Cross-border M&As in the financial sector: Is banking different from insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 15-29, January.
    11. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2010_004 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Holopainen, Helena, 2007. "Integration of financial supervision," Research Discussion Papers 12/2007, Bank of Finland.
    13. Berger, Helge & Hefeker, Carsten, 2006. "Does Financial Integration Make Banks Act More Prudential? Regulation, Foreign Owned Banks, and the Lender-of-Last Resort," HWWA Discussion Papers 339, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    14. Helge Berger & Carsten Hefeker, 2008. "Does financial integration make banks more vulnerable? Regulation, foreign owned banks, and the lender-of-last resort," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 371-393, February.
    15. Sungho Choi & Bill B. Francis & Iftekhar Hasan, 2010. "Cross‐Border Bank M&As and Risk: Evidence from the Bond Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(4), pages 615-645, June.
    16. Sungho Choi & Bill B. Francis & Iftekhar Hasan, 2010. "Cross‐Border Bank M&As and Risk: Evidence from the Bond Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(4), pages 615-645, June.
    17. Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka & Mälkönen, Ville, 2009. "Blanket guarantee and restructuring decisions for multinational banks in a bargaining model," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 16/2009, Bank of Finland.
    18. Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka & Mälkönen, Ville, 2009. "Blanket guarantee and restructuring decisions for multinational banks in a bargaining model," Research Discussion Papers 16/2009, Bank of Finland.
    19. Calzolari, Giacomo & Loranth, Gyongyi, 2011. "Regulation of multinational banks: A theoretical inquiry," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 178-198, April.
    20. Mälkönen, Ville & Niinimäki, J.-P., 2012. "Blanket guarantee, deposit insurance and restructuring decisions for multinational banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 84-95.
    21. Holopainen, Helena, 2007. "Integration of financial supervision," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 12/2007, Bank of Finland.
    22. Claudia M. Buch & Gayle L. DeLong, 2008. "Banking Globalization: International Consolidation and Mergers in Banking," IAW Discussion Papers 38, Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (IAW).
    23. Amihud, Yakov & DeLong, Gayle L. & Saunders, Anthony, 2002. "The effects of cross-border bank mergers on bank risk and value," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 857-877, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank supervision; Bank closure; Deposit insurance; Home country control; International banks; Takeovers in banking; Cross-border bank mergers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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