The Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control
AbstractIn this paper, we analyse the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies that assert jurisdictions simultaneously. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both explicitly specified. We find that conflict in international merger control is less likely to occur when economic integration is high. Hence, ‘globalization’ should alleviate rather than exacerbate conflict. In addition, we observe that conflict is less likely to arise between countries of different size and for extreme policy rules (very lenient or very strict) towards dominance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2621.
Date of creation: Nov 2000
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- Damien J. NEVEN & Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER, 2000. "The Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 00.25, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
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