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Monetary Discipline and Cooperation in the European Monetary System: A Synthesis

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  • Mélitz, Jacques

Abstract

This paper tries to explain how, despite its fundamental asymmetry, the European Monetary System may benefit all its members. I argue that the high-inflation members obtain benefits of increased monetary discipline, while the others experience improvements in their international competitiveness. For the low-inflation members, moreover, the incentive to disinflate increases as a result of EMS membership. Finally, the benefits of membership for low-inflation countries are secure; for those with higher inflation, the gains from membership depend on a variety of factors whose net effect is uncertain.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 219.

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Date of creation: Jan 1988
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:219

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Related research

Keywords: Competitiveness; European Monetary System; Incentives; Monetary Discipline;

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Cited by:
  1. Oscar Bajo & Maria Dolores Montavez, 1999. "There Was Monetary Autonomy In Europe On the Eve Of Emu? The German Dominance Hypothesis Re-Examined," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 9906, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
  2. Óscar Bajo Rubio & Simón Sosvilla Rivero & Fernando Fernández Rodríguez, 2000. "Asymmetry In The Ems: New Evidence Based On Non-Linear Forecasts," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 0001, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
  3. Joseph Daniels & David VanHoose, 1998. "Two-Country Models of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 265-284, July.
  4. Merih Uctum, 1996. "European integration and asymmetry in the EMS," Research Paper 9605, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  5. Julius Horvath & Magda Kandil & Subhash C. Sharma, 1996. "On the European Monetary System: The Spillover Effects of German Shocks and Disinflation," Macroeconomics 9605001, EconWPA.
  6. McKibbin, Warwick J. & Bok, Tomas, 2001. "The European Monetary Union: were there alternatives to the ECB?: A quantitative evaluation," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 23(7), pages 775-806, October.
  7. Karsten Biltoft & Christian Boersch, 1992. "Interest rate causality and asymmetry in the EMS," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 297-306, October.
  8. Aubert, Ludovic & Laskar, Daniel, 1999. "Private information : an argument for a fixed exchange rate system," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9903, CEPREMAP.

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