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Coordination, Cooperation, Contagion and Currency Crises

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  • Loisel, Olivier
  • Martin, Philippe

Abstract

We analyse the effect of trade spillovers and of international coordination on currency crises. To do this, we present a model that builds on two separate literatures: the literature on international monetary cooperation on the one hand, and the literature on currency crises, or more precisely on the 'escape clause' approach of fixed exchange rate systems on the other hand. We show that the more important trade spillovers the more likely self-fulfilling speculative crises are and the larger the set of multiple equilibria. Coordination decreases the possibility of simultaneous self-fulfilling speculative crises in the region and reduces the set of multiple equilibria. However, regional coordination, even though welfare improving, makes countries more dependent on other countries' fundamentals so that it may induce more contagion: a negative shock in one country of the region increases the possibility of a currency crisis in the region because it reduces the feasibility of coordination.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2075.

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Date of creation: Feb 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2075

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Keywords: Contagion; Cooperation; Coordination; Escape Clause; Exchange Rate Crisis; Fixed Exchange Rates; trade spillovers;

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References

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  1. Maurice Obstfeld, 1995. "Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features," NBER Working Papers 5285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Bensaid, B.B. & Jeanne, O., 1995. "The Instability of Fixed Exchange Rate Systems when Raising the Nominal Interest Rate is Costly," Papers 9536, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  3. F. Gulcin Ozkan & Alan Sutherland, . "A Model of the ERM Crisis," EPRU Working Paper Series 93-09, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  4. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, December.
  5. Giancarol Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti & Nouriel Roubini & Cedric Tille, 1999. "Competitive devaluations: a welfare-based approach," Staff Reports 58, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  6. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-25, August.
  7. Jeanne, Olivier, 1997. "Are currency crises self-fulfilling?: A test," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3-4), pages 263-286, November.
  8. Loisel, Olivier & Martin, Philippe, 2001. "Coordination, cooperation, contagion and currency crises," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 399-419, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Loisel, Olivier & Martin, Philippe, 1999. "Coordination, Cooperation, Contagion and Currency Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 2075, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Buiter, Willem H & Sibert, Anne, 1999. "UDROP: A Small Contribution to the New International Financial Architecture," CEPR Discussion Papers 2138, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Willem H. Buiter & Anne Sibert, 1999. "UDROP: a small contribution to the international financial architecture," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20224, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  4. Renee Fry & Vance Martin & Brenda González-Hermosillo & Mardi Dungey, 2002. "International Contagion Effects from the Russian Crisis and the LTCM Near-Collapse," IMF Working Papers 02/74, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Álvaro A. Novo, 2003. "Contagious Currency Crisis: A Spatial Probit Approach," Working Papers w200305, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
  6. Dungey, Mardi & Fry, Renee & Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Brenda & Martin, Vance, 2006. "Contagion in international bond markets during the Russian and the LTCM crises," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 1-27, April.
  7. Giancarlo Marini & Giovanni Piersanti, 2012. "Models of Speculative Attacks and Crashes in International Capital Markets," CEIS Research Paper 245, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 24 Jul 2012.
  8. Roberta De Santis, 2004. "Has Trade Structure Any Importance in the Trasmission of Currency Shocks? An Empirical Application for Central and Eastern European Acceding Countries to Eu," ISAE Working Papers 43, ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics - (Rome, ITALY).

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