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Living Standards and Incentives in Transition: the Implications of Unemployment Insurance Exhaustion in Hungary

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  • Micklewright, John
  • Nagy, Gyula

Abstract

The single most likely way to leave the unemployment insurance (UI) register in Hungary is not by getting a job but by exhausting entitlement to benefit. Two questions follow. First, what are the implications of the cessation of UI for living standards? Second, does UI exhaustion have much effect on the probability of getting a job through increasing incentives to work? We investigate these issues with a survey of persons exhausting entitlement to UI in Summer 1995, paying special attention to the household circumstances of the unemployed and to the probabilities of claiming and being awarded means-tested assistance benefit.

Suggested Citation

  • Micklewright, John & Nagy, Gyula, 1999. "Living Standards and Incentives in Transition: the Implications of Unemployment Insurance Exhaustion in Hungary," CEPR Discussion Papers 2061, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2061
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ansgar Belke & Martin Hebler, 2000. "EU enlargement and labour markets in the CEECs," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 35(5), pages 219-230, September.
    2. Anton Nivorozhkin, 2005. "New estimates of the risk and duration of registered unemployment in urban Russia," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 60, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
    3. Stephen P. Jenkins & Carlos García‐Serrano, 2004. "The Relationship between Unemployment Benefits and Re‐employment Probabilities: Evidence from Spain," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 66(2), pages 239-260, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hungary; Incentives; living standards; Social Assistance; Unemployment Insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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