International Policy Cooperation and Model Uncertainty
Abstract
The main obstacles to coordinating policies in practice are uncertainty about the correct model to use for policy design, and uncertainty about external variables. This paper examines the former problem. Numerical calculations using ten models from the recent Brookings Multicountry comparison exercise showed both policies and the gains to coordination are quite sensitive to model variations - and hence to model errors. A framework is therefore set up in which policy-makers are able to choose their model and their policies jointly in order to try and protect the gains from coordination from potential model misspecifications and/or disagreements over which model is most appropriate. That produces an alternative policy bargaining system and better results in terms of the success of coordination.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 190.Length:
Date of creation: Jul 1987
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:190
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Keywords: Bargaining; Coordination Policy Robustness; International Policy Cooperation; Model Uncertainty;References
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Jeffrey Frankel & Scott Erwin & Katharine Rockett, 1992. "A Note on Internationally Coordinated Policy Packages Intended to be Robust Under Model Uncertainty," NBER Working Papers 3747, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- A.J. Hallet, 1998. "When Do Target Zones Work? An Examination of Exchange Rate Targeting as a Device for Coordinating Economic Policies," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 115-138, April.
- Jeffrey A. Frankel, 1989.
"Obstacles to International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination,"
NBER Working Papers
2505, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Frankel, Jeffrey, 1987. "Obstacles to International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt2vv7z9cr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Jeffrey A. Frankel., 1987. "Obstacles to International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination," Economics Working Papers 8737, University of California at Berkeley.
- Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Klaassen, Franc, 2001.
"Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Roel Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Frank Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," CESifo Working Paper Series 599, CESifo Group Munich.
- Roel Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Franc Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," IHEID Working Papers 04-2001, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
- Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Franc Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," IMF Working Papers 01/178, International Monetary Fund.
- Eichengreen, Barry & Ghironi, Fabio, 1997.
"European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation,"
Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series
qt10d518tg, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Barry Eichengreen & Fabio Ghironi, 1998. "European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation," International Trade 9804001, EconWPA.
- Barry Eichengreen and Fabio Ghironi., 1997. "European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C97-091, University of California at Berkeley.
- Carlo Carraro, 1997. "Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European Monetary Coordination," Empirica, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 163-177, October.
- Matthew B. Canzoneri & Hali J. Edison, 1989.
"A new interpretation of the coordination problem and its empirical significance,"
International Finance Discussion Papers
340, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Matthew B. Canzoneri & Hali J. Edison, 1990. "A new interpretation of the coordination problem and its empirical significance," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 399-435.
- Patrick Artus, 1992. "Passage à l'union économique et monétaire en Europe : effets sur la croissance et les politiques budgétaires," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 106(5), pages 123-137.
- Thomas Willett, 1999. "Developments in the Political Economy of Policy Coordination," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 221-253, May.
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