Project Evaluation and Organizational Form
AbstractThis paper analyses the impact of inequality on growth when technical progress is driven by innovations. It is assumed that consumers have hierarchic preferences. As a result inequality affects demand and therefore the incentive to innovate. Whether more inequality is harmful or beneficial for growth depends on the initial distribution. Complementarities between a technical and a pecuniary externality resulting from the innovation process may generate multiple equilibria. Redistribution may push an economy trapped in underdevelopment to a high-growth regime.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1888.
Date of creation: May 1998
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