Project Evaluation and Organizational Form

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Project Evaluation and Organizational Form

Author Info

Gehrig, Thomas
Régibeau, Pierre
Rockett, Katharine

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Abstract

This paper analyses the impact of inequality on growth when technical progress is driven by innovations. It is assumed that consumers have hierarchic preferences. As a result inequality affects demand and therefore the incentive to innovate. Whether more inequality is harmful or beneficial for growth depends on the initial distribution. Complementarities between a technical and a pecuniary externality resulting from the innovation process may generate multiple equilibria. Redistribution may push an economy trapped in underdevelopment to a high-growth regime.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1888.

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Date of creation: May 1998
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1888

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Rodrigo J. Harrison & Roberto Munoz, 2003. "Stability and Equilibrium Selection in a Link Formation Game," Game Theory and Information 0306004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Yannis M. Ioannides, 2003. "Complexity and Organizational Architecture," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0313, Department of Economics, Tufts University. [Downloadable!]

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