Excess Capacity as an Incentive Device
AbstractThis paper studies the factors determining plant size and interplant output allocation within the boundaries of a multiplant firm under conditions of demand uncertainty. It shows that asymmetric information between headquarters and individual plants is one factor determining plant size and output allocation: since the existence of excess capacity creates ‘high powered’ incentives for individual plants, capacity levels in a second-best setting exceed the corresponding benchmark in a first-best world if capacity prices are low. The presence of ‘agency costs’ in the case of fully-utilized capacity reverses this result for high-capacity prices. Also, in a recession output is not necessarily assigned to the plant with the lowest production costs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1625.
Date of creation: May 1997
Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
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