Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Strategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Rules

Contents:

Author Info

  • Pauwels, Wilfried
  • Vandenbussche, Hylke
  • Weverbergh, Marcel

Abstract

This paper analyses how European anti-dumping policy under imperfect competition affects firm behaviour and domestic welfare. Our theoretical model is the first to complement the European empirical literature on anti-dumping policy (see Messerlin (1989), Hindley (1988), Tharakan and Waelbroeck (1994)), and can usefully be compared with recent papers dealing with the effects of US anti-dumping policy (Reitzes (1993), Fischer (1992), Prusa (1994)). We use a two-period Cournot duopoly model with a European and a foreign firm that differ in costs and products. European anti-dumping policy differs from its US counterpart mainly in terms of injury margin calculation and the derivation of the anti-dumping duty. European anti-dumping rules provide the home firm with incentives to either induce or to feign injury. Our results indicate that when the level of protection is endogenous, the strategic trade policy argument for protection need not apply. Our findings also suggest that US anti-dumping rules perform better than European rules in terms of welfare and in terms of protecting domestic value added and employment.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP1565.asp
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1565.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1565

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: Anti-Dumping; Imperfect Competition; Two-period Cournot Oligopoly;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Veugelers, Reinhilde & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 1999. "European anti-dumping policy and the profitability of national and international collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-28, January.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1565. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.