Voting for Jobs: Policy Persistence and Unemployment
AbstractThis paper studies, in a model with unemployment, how labour market status affects the preferences for public spending, in the form of a public good or subsidies. It then derives the implications for the dynamics of government expenditures under the hypothesis of majority voting. These will exhibit positive persistence if the employed are marginally more powerful than the unemployed, and negative persistence if the unemployed are marginally more powerful. Under a uniform distribution of tastes for the public good, there is no persistence. The preferences of the unemployed may be non-single-peaked, so that high unemployment may destroy the existence of a voting equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1428.
Date of creation: Jun 1996
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Saint-Paul, G., 1996. "Voting for Jobs: Policy Persistence and Unemployment," DELTA Working Papers 96-02, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
- J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers
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- Hassler, John & Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1999.
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