Capital Export, Unemployment, and Illegal Immigration
AbstractThis paper analyses capital export controls under majority voting. It is shown that individuals vote according to their factor endowment ratio. An individual’s optimal restriction is tighter, the lower their capital-labour ratio and the larger the country; it is also tighter if unemployment prevails. If there is illegal immigration, however, results are dramatically reversed: the conflict of interests collapses and all individuals favour unrestricted capital export until immigration is eliminated – regardless of their relative factor endowment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1394.
Date of creation: May 1996
Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
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