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Fiscal Prerequisites for a Viable Managed Exchange Rate Regime: A Non-Technical Eclectic Introduction

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  • Buiter, Willem H.

Abstract

The paper first reviews the budget identities of the fiscal and monetary authorities and the solvency constraint or present value budget constraint of the consolidated public sector, for both closed and open economies. It then discusses the new conventional wisdom concerning the fiscal roots of inflation and the budgetary prerequisites for generating and stopping hyperinflation. The popular rational expectations model of "Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic" of Sargent and Wallace yields ambiguous predictions concerning the response of inflation to an increase in the fundamental deficit. In addition the model is incapable of generating hyperinflation: the only runaway, explosive or unstable behaviour the model can exhibit is "hyperdeflation"] In the open economy, the need to maintain a managed exchange rate regime and the government's need to remain solvent do not impose any constraint on the growth rate of domestic credit. Obstfeld's proposition to the contrary is due to the omission of government bonds and borrowing in his analysis. There is not yet any "deep structural" theory justifying the (exogenous) lower bounds on the stock of foreign exchange reserves which are a characteristic assumption of the literature on collapsing exchange rate regimes. In the absence of such a theory of "international liquidity", one cannot construct a satisfactory model of a foreign exchange crisis that is not at the same time a government solvency crisis. If it is assumed that such lower bounds do exist, the existence of a pecuniary opportunity cost to holding reserves influences whether particular fiscal and financial policy choices are consistent with the prolonged survival of a managed exchange rate regime.

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  • Buiter, Willem H., 1986. "Fiscal Prerequisites for a Viable Managed Exchange Rate Regime: A Non-Technical Eclectic Introduction," CEPR Discussion Papers 129, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:129
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    1. Buiter, Willem H., 1987. "Borrowing to defend the exchange rate and the timing and magnitude of speculative attacks," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 221-239, November.
    2. Connolly, Michael B & Taylor, Dean, 1984. "The Exact Timing of the Collapse of an Exchange Rate Regime and Its Impact on the Relative Price of Traded Goods," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(2), pages 194-207, May.
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    6. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1984. "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Brian Griffiths & Geoffrey E. Wood (ed.), Monetarism in the United Kingdom, pages 15-41, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    8. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-325, August.
    9. Willem H. Buiter, 1984. "Comment on T. J. Sargent and N. Wallace: Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Brian Griffiths & Geoffrey E. Wood (ed.), Monetarism in the United Kingdom, pages 42-60, Palgrave Macmillan.
    10. Flood, Robert P. & Garber, Peter M., 1984. "Collapsing exchange-rate regimes : Some linear examples," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 1-13, August.
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    12. James Tobin & Willem H. Buiter, 1974. "Long Run Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy on Aggregate Demand," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 384, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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    Cited by:

    1. de Groof, R.J. & van Tuijl, M.A., 1993. "The twin-debt problem in an interdependent world," Research Memorandum FEW 588, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. de Groof, R.J. & van Tuijl, M.A., 1991. "Financial integration and fiscal policy in interdependent two-sector economies with real and nominal wage rigidity," Other publications TiSEM 2661ef6d-dfec-4cfd-891b-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Alpo Willman, 1991. "Why there is a lower bound on the central bank's foreign reserves," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 113-129, Autumn.
    4. de Groof, R.J. & van Tuijl, M.A., 1991. "Financial integration and fiscal policy in interdependent two-sector economies with real and nominal wage rigidity," Research Memorandum FEW 526, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Buiter, Willem H., 1988. "Can Public Spending Cuts be Inflationary?," CEPR Discussion Papers 225, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. de Groof, R.J. & van Tuijl, M.A., 1993. "Aspects of goods market integration : A two-country-two-sector analysis," Other publications TiSEM 87296c05-45a4-42f2-a4ff-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. de Groof, R.J. & van Tuijl, M.A., 1992. "Commercial integration and fiscal policy in interdependent, financially integrated two-sector economies with real and nominal wage rigidity," Other publications TiSEM 892948a8-83fa-42c0-96bf-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. de Groof, R.J. & van Tuijl, M.A., 1992. "Commercial integration and fiscal policy in interdependent, financially integrated two-sector economies with real and nominal wage rigidity," Research Memorandum FEW 567, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. de Groof, R.J. & van Tuijl, M.A., 1993. "The twin-debt problem in an interdependent world," Other publications TiSEM 50e0a068-20c7-4bf4-a6e3-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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