Existing theories of unions emphasize their impact on wage levels relative to the opportunity cost of leisure. This paper explores the possibility that monopoly unions provide income insurance against idiosyncratic wage variability. An optimal union contract is characterized by real wage and other types of flexibility only in response to systematic changes in underlying uncertainty. Under such conditions, there is no presumption that the `union wage premium' relative to the free market wage is positive. The model shows the effect of unemployment benefits, average productivity, and risk on the desirability of union membership, and offers an economic interpretation of equity and solidarity in union policy. It can also explain the negative correlation between inequality and unionism in developed countries.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
1232.
Find related papers by JEL classification: J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
John DiNardo & Kevin Hallock & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1997.
"Unions and Managerial Pay,"
NBER Working Papers
6318, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
DiNardo, J. & Hallock, K. & Pischke, J.-S., 1998.
"Unions and Managerial Pay,"
Papers
97-98-18, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.