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Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information

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  • Fagart, Marie-Cécile

Abstract

This paper generalizes the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976], and is dealing with a game where two principals compete for an agent, when the agent has private information. The studied game has an efficient equilibrium, when the payoff of the principal does not depend on private information. Competition in markets with asymmetric information does not always imply loss of efficiency. An explain in terms of type of uncertainty is proposed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CEPREMAP in its series CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) with number 9317.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:9317

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Cited by:
  1. Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
  2. Villeneuve, Bertrand, 2003. "Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5370, Paris Dauphine University.

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