Ordinal independence in non-linear utility theory
AbstractIndividual behavior under uncertainty is characterized using a new axiom, ordinal independence, which is a weakened form of the von Neumann-Morgenstern independence axiom. It states that if two distributions share a tail in common, then this tail can be modified without altering the individual's preference between these distributions. Preference is determined by the tail on which the distributions differ. This axiom implies an appealing and simple functional firm for a numerical representation of preferences. It generalizes the form of anticipated utility, and it explains some well-known forms of behavior, such as the Friedman-Savage paradox, that anticipated utility cannot. Copyright 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CEPREMAP in its series CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) with number 8818.
Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: 1988
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