Regulated competition in health insurance markets
AbstractThe efficient delivery of medical services may be pursued by intensifying competition among health care insurers. This paper develops a model of regulated competition among health care insurers. It shows that increasing competition may foster efficiency-raising activities, reduce insurer profits and lower health care costs. However, it may also increase the variability of consumer premiums and increase risk-type specific selection activities by insurers as the government will generally lack information on the risk characteristics of the insured.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in its series CPB Research Memorandum with number 171.
Date of creation: Nov 2000
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-04-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-IAS-2002-05-07 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2002-04-25 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2002-04-25 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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