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Regulated Competition in Health Insurance Markets

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Author Info
Rudy Douven ()
Abstract

The efficient delivery of medical services may be pursued by intensifying competition among health care insurers. This paper develops a model of regulated competition among health care insurers. It shows that increasing competition may foster efficiency-raising activities, reduce insurer profits and lower health care costs. However, it may also increase the variability of consumer premiums and increase risk-type specific selection activities by insurers as the government will generally lack information on the risk characteristics of the insured.

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File URL: http://www.cpb.nl/eng/pub/cpbreeksen/onderzoek/171/om171.pdf
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Paper provided by CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in its series Research memoranda with number 171.

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Handle: RePEc:cpb:resmem:171

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Related research
Keywords: health care; health insurance; risk adjustment; regulated competition;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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  1. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M, 1998. "Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1093-1110, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 1998. "Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-19, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Daniel Altman & David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, 2000. "Enrollee Mix, Treatment Intensity, and Cost in Competing Indemnity and HMO Plans," NBER Working Papers 7832, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-23.

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