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Incentives and Regional Coordination in Employment Services

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  • Arjen de Vetten

Abstract

Due to yardstick competition, municipalities have financial incentives to reduce unemployment, but are not likely to cooperate with each other to have the scale advantages of a regional labour market. On the other hand, a regional public employment service, like the CWI in the Netherlands, has a higher probability and value of matching, but it lacks the incentives to exert the optimal mediation effort.This paper presents a game theoretical model that addresses the trade off between regional coordination and incentives in the mediation of unemployed in the Netherlands. The model is calibrated with information on vacancies and CWI clients for the Netherlands, in order to get an impression whether it is optimal to have a public employment service in the context of this model. Finally, various institutional settings, like a privatised employment service and a performance contract for the employment office, are considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Arjen de Vetten, 2007. "Incentives and Regional Coordination in Employment Services," CPB Memorandum 190, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpb:memodm:190
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers

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