This paper presents a game theoretical model that addresses the trade off between regional coordination and incentives in the mediation of unemployed in the Netherlands. Due to yardstick competition, municipalities have financial incentives to reduce unemployment, but are not likely to cooperate with each other to have the scale advantages of a regional labour market. On the other hand, a regional public employment service, like the CWI in the Netherlands, has a higher probability and value of matching, but it lacks the incentives to exert the optimal mediation effort. The model is calibrated with information on vacancies and CWI clients for the Netherlands, in order to get an impression whether it is optimal to have a public employment service in the context of this model. Finally, various institutional settings, like a privatised employment service and a performance contract for the employment office, are considered.
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Paper provided by CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in its series CPB Memoranda with number
190.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies
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Coles, Melvyn G & Smith, Eric, 1998.
"Marketplaces and Matching,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(1), pages 239-54, February.
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