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Faut-il régionaliser l'enseignement supérieur?

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  • JUSTMAN, M.
  • THISSE, J.-F.

Abstract

[fre] On étudie un modèle de concurrence entre régions qui ont en charge la gestion et le financement de l'enseignement supérieur et on compare les solutions ainsi obtenues à l'optimum social. [eng] Should funding of higher education be decentralized among local governments ? . . We consider a model of fiscal competition when higher education is run by local governments and we compare the decentralized solutions to the social optimum.
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Suggested Citation

  • Justman, M. & Thisse, J.-F., 1997. "Faut-il régionaliser l'enseignement supérieur?," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1270, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1270
    Note: In : Revue Economique, 48 (3), 569-577, 1997
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(2), pages 265-286.
    2. Jacques-François Thisse & Antoine Billot, 1995. "Modèles de choix individuels discrets : théorie et applications à la micro-économie," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(3), pages 921-931.
    3. Shields, Gail M & Shields, Michael P, 1989. "The Emergence of Migration Theory and a Suggested New Direction," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(4), pages 277-304.
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