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Basing point pricing: Competition versus collusion

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  • THISSE, Jacques-François
  • VIVES, Xavier

Abstract

The authors consider the implications of game-theoretic models for the competitive or collusive nature of basing point pricing. In one-shot games, equilibrium price schedules do not generally conform to basing point pricing with unrestricted price competition. Nevertheless, basing point pricing can emerge in dynamic contexts. Define modified FOB price policy as using FOB in one's natural market and matching the rival's delivered price whenever profitable. A configuration where both firms do this is a subgame perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game where firms choose first price policies and then compete in the marketplace. Further, with repeated.competition basing point pricing can be used as punishment device. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • THISSE, Jacques-François & VIVES, Xavier, 1992. "Basing point pricing: Competition versus collusion," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1003
    Note: In : The Journal of Industrial Economics, 40(3), 249-260, 1992
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    Cited by:

    1. Miklós-Thal, Jeanine, 2008. "Delivered pricing and the impact of spatial differentiation on cartel stability," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1365-1380, November.
    2. Hongbin Cai & Uday Rajan, 2005. "Incentive Compatible Collusion and Investment," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 6(1), pages 37-52, May.
    3. Aguirre, Inaki & Espinosa, Maria Paz & Macho-Stadler, Ines, 1998. "Strategic entry deterrence through spatial price discrimination," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 297-314, May.
    4. Jeanine Thal, 2006. "Delivered Pricing and the Effect of Horizontal Differentiation on Optimal Collusion," Working Papers 2006-22, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    5. Vives, Xavier, 2005. "Games with strategic complementarities: New applications to industrial organization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(7-8), pages 625-637, September.
    6. Vidyanand Choudhary, 2010. "Use of Pricing Schemes for Differentiating Information Goods," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 21(1), pages 78-92, March.
    7. Florian Gössl & Alexander Rasch, 2020. "Collusion under different pricing schemes," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 910-931, October.

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