Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Contractually stable networks

Contents:

Author Info

  • CAULIER, Jean-François
  • MAULEON, Ana
  • VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent

Abstract

We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, whre the network specifies the natyure of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equiibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. Moreover, requiring the consent of group members may help to reconcile stability and efficiency

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0356-4
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -2477.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-2477

Note: In : International Journal of Game Theory, 42(2), 483-499, 2013
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Phone: 32(10)474321
Fax: +32 10474304
Email:
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Ana, MAULEON & José, SEMPERE-MONERRIS & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH, 2005. "Networks of Manufacturers and Retailers," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques), Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques 2005036, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  2. Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2001. "A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 485-508, June.
  3. Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit, 2003. "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-85, April.
  4. Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1997. "Stable Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 322-344, October.
  6. Page Jr, Frank H & Wooders, Myrna H. & Kamat, Samir, 2002. "Networks And Farsighted Stability," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 660, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  7. Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2005. "Strongly stable networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 420-444, May.
  8. Taiji Furusawa & Hideo Konishi, 2002. "Free Trade Networks," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics 548, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 08 Sep 2003.
  9. Goyal, S. & Joshi, S., 1999. "Bilateralism and free trade," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI 9953-/A, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
  10. Frank H. Page, Jr. & Myrna H. Wooders, 2006. "Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0614, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  11. Ping Wang & Alison Watts, 2006. "Formation of buyer-seller trade networks in a quality-differentiated product market," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(3), pages 971-1004, August.
  12. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
  13. Frank H. Page, Jr., Myrna H. Wooders, 2009. "Club Networks with Multiple Memberships and Noncooperative Stability," Caepr Working Papers, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington 2009-005, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  14. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 2004. "Rationalizability for social environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 135-156, October.
  15. Francis Bloch, 1995. "Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 537-556, Autumn.
  16. Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2000. "Networks versus Vertical Integration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(3), pages 570-601, Autumn.
  17. Sang-Seung, Yi, 1996. "Endogenous formation of customs unions under imperfect competition: open regionalism is good," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 153-177, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Nils Roehl, 2013. "Two-Stage Allocation Rules," Working Papers CIE 73, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics.
  2. repec:pdn:wpaper:73 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00881125 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2013. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00881125, HAL.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-2477. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.