Smart-grid investments, regulation and organization
AbstractGrid infrastructure managers worldwide are facing demands for reinvestments in new assets with higher on-grid and off-grid functionality in order to meet new environmental targets. The roles of the current actors will change as the vertical interfaces between regulated and unregulated tasks become blurred. In this paper, we characterize some of the effects of new asset investments policy on the network tasks, assets and costs and contrast this with the assumptions of the current economic network regulation. To provide structure, we present a model of investment provision under regulation between a distribution system operator and a potential investorâgenerator. The results from the model confirm the hypothesis that network regulation should find a focal point, should integrate externalities in the performance assessment and should avoid wide delegation of contracting-billing for smart-grid investments.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -2457.
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Note: In : Energy Policy, 52, 656-666, 2013
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- Agrell, Per J. & Bogetoft, Peter & Mikkers, Misja, 2013. "Smart-grid investments, regulation and organization," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 656-666.
- AGRELL, Per & BOGETOFT, Peter, 2011. "Smart-grid investments, regulation and organization," CORE Discussion Papers 2011072, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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