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Voting on pensions: sex and marriage

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  • LEROUX, Marie-Louise
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre
  • RACIONERO, Maria

Abstract

Existing political economy models of pensions focus on age and productivity. In this paper we incorporate two additional individual characteristics: sex and marital status. We ignore the role of age, by assuming that people vote at the start of their life, and characterize the preferred rate of taxation that finances a Beveridgean pension scheme when individuals differ in wage, sex and marital status. We allow for two types of couples: one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner couples. Marriage pools both wage and longevity differences between men and women. Hence singles tend to have more extreme preferred tax rates than couples. We show that the majority voting outcome depends on the relative number of one-breadwinner couples and on the size of derived pension rights.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -2308.

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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-2308

Note: In : European Journal of Political Economy, 27(2), 281-296, 2011
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References

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  1. Grégory de Walque, 2004. "Voting on pensions: a survey," Working Paper Research 62, National Bank of Belgium.
  2. LEROUX, Marie-Louise, . "The political economy of social security under differential longevity and voluntary retirement," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2227, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. LEROUX, Marie - Louise & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2010. "The political economy of derived pension rights," CORE Discussion Papers 2010048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER , Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "The political economy of social security," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1475, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Antoine Bommier & Thierry Magnac & Benoît Rapoport & Muriel Roger, 2005. "Droits à la retraite et mortalité différentielle," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 168(2), pages 1-16.
  6. Julia Lynn Coronado & Don Fullerton & Thomas Glass, 2000. "The Progressivity of Social Security," NBER Working Papers 7520, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Jongkyun Choi, 2006. "The Role of Derived Rights for Old-age Income Security of Women," OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 43, OECD Publishing.
  8. Rainald Borck, 2007. "On the Choice of Public Pensions when Income and Life Expectancy Are Correlated," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 711-725, 08.
  9. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(3), pages 373-88, September.
  10. Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2001. "Redistribution in the Current U.S. Social Security System," NBER Working Papers 8625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Jonathan Gruber & David A. Wise, 1999. "Social Security and Retirement around the World," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number grub99-1, octubre-d.
  12. Pencavel, John, 1998. "Assortative Mating by Schooling and the Work Behavior of Wives and Husbands," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 326-29, May.
  13. Galasso, Vincenzo & Profeta, Paola, 2002. "The political economy of social security: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-29, March.
  14. Jonathan Gruber & David A. Wise, 1999. "Introduction to "Social Security and Retirement around the World"," NBER Chapters, in: Social Security and Retirement around the World, pages 1-35 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
  1. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2011. "Old-age Social Security vs. Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-26-Rev.2, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised Aug 2013.
  2. Tetsuo Ono, 2011. "Marital Status and Derived Pension Rights: A Political Economy Model of Public Pensions with Borrowing Constraints," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-32, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
  3. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2011. "Old-age Social Security vs. Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-26, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
  4. M.L. Leroux & P. Pestieau, 2014. "Social Security and Family Support," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(1), pages 115-143, February.
  5. M.-L. Leroux & P. Pestieau, 2012. "The political economy of derived pension rights," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 19(5), pages 753-776, October.

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