Networks of knowledge among unionized firms
AbstractWe develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) and vice versa.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -2055.
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Note: In : Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'Economique, 41(3), 971-997, 2008
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- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
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