Is there a political support for the double burden on prolonged activity?
AbstractIn many countries elderly workers are subject to a double distortion when they consider prolonging their activity: the payroll tax and a reduction in their pension rights. It is often argued that such a double burden would not be socially desirable. We consider a setting where it would be rejected by both a utilitarian and a Rawlsian social planner. Furthermore, each individual would also reject it as a citizen candidate. We show that the double burden may nevertheless be (second-best) Pareto efficient and can be supported by a particular structure of social weights biased towards the more productive workers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1865.
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Note: In : Economics of Governance, 7, 143-154, 2006.
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- Georges Casamatta & Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2006. "Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 143-154, May.
- Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004. "Is There a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4706, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004. "Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity?," IDEI Working Papers 315, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
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