Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Optimal retirements and disability benefits with audit

Contents:

Author Info

  • CREMER, Helmuth
  • LOZACHMEUR, Jean-Marie
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre

Abstract

This paper studies the design of retirement and disability policies when individuals differ in both productivity and health. The second-best solution implies (downward) distortions in the (per-period) labor supply and in the choice of retirement age for some individuals, and lesser redistribution towards workers with poor health and low productivity. This problem can be mitigated when disability screening is available. Optimal disability screening involves a random component; it is never optimal to audit all individuals who claim to be disabled. The optimal audit probability strikes a balance between audit costs and benefits obtained by relaxing an otherwise binding incentive constraint.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/0015221042396131
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1836.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-1836

Note: In : FinanzArchiv, 60(3), 278-295, 2004
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Phone: 32(10)474321
Fax: +32 10474304
Email:
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2006. "Disability Testing and Retirement," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5546, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. L. Jacquet & D. Van De Gaer, 2009. "A comparison of optimal tax policies when compensation or responsibility matter," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 09/615, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  3. Helmut CREMER & Jean-Marie LOZACHMEUR & Pierre PESTIEAU, 2006. "Retirement age and health expenditures," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 83-84, pages 167-186.
  4. Kuhn, Michael & Nuscheler, Robert, 2011. "Optimal public provision of nursing homes and the role of information," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 795-810, July.
  5. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2006. "Social Security and Retirement Decision: A Positive and Normative Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5542, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Laurence Jacquet & Dirk Van de gaer, 2013. "Politiques fiscales optimales pour les bas revenus et principe de compensation," THEMA Working Papers 2013-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-1836. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.