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Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume

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  • ATTAR, Andrea
  • CAMPIONI, Eloisa

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1712.

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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-1712

Note: In : Research in Economics, 57, 315-443, 2003.
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References

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  1. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  2. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Moore, John, 1997. "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 211-48, April.
  3. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2003. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A Reply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 391-393, January.
  6. Suarez, Javier & Sussman, Oren, 1997. "Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss Economy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1604, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Townsend, Robert M., 1988. "Information constrained insurance : The revelation principle extended," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 411-450.
  8. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2000. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement Is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 119-134, January.
  9. Charles W. Calomiris & Berry Wilson, 1996. "Bank capital and portfolio management: the 1930s capital crunch and scramble to shed risk," Proceedings 521, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  10. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
  11. Pietro Reichlin & Paolo Siconolfi, 2004. "Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 75-109, 07.
  12. Jeffrey Lacker, 2001. "Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 842-859, October.
  13. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  14. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  15. Stephen D. Williamson, 1984. "Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermediation, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," Working Papers 583, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  16. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October.
  17. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
  18. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, Ivan, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415, May.
  19. Webb, David C, 1992. "Two-Period Financial Contracts with Private Information and Costly State Verification," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 1113-23, August.
  20. Chang, Chun, 1990. "The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 68-86, October.
  21. C. Choe, 1998. "A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 237-255.
  22. Tridib Sharma, 2003. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 387-390, January.
  23. John H. Boyd & Bruce D. Smith, 1995. "The evolution of debt and equity markets in economic development," Working Papers 542, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  24. Mathias Dewatripont, 1989. "Renegotiation and information revelation over time: the case of optimal labor contacts," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9573, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  25. Boyd, John H. & Smith, Bruce D., 1999. "The Use of Debt and Equity in Optimal Financial Contracts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 270-316, October.
  26. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
  27. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
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Cited by:
  1. ATTAR, Andréa, 2003. "Financial contracting along the business cycle," CORE Discussion Papers 2003069, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 407-433, September.

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