Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume

Contents:

Author Info

  • ATTAR, Andrea
  • CAMPIONI, Eloisa

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2003.05.001,
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Alain GILLIS)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1712.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-1712

Note: In : Research in Economics, 57, 315-443, 2003.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Phone: 32(10)474321
Fax: +32 10474304
Email:
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  2. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
  3. John Moore & Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, . "Credit Cycles," Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 1995-5, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  4. C. Choe, 1998. "A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 237-255.
  5. Webb, David C, 1992. "Two-Period Financial Contracts with Private Information and Costly State Verification," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 1113-23, August.
  6. Tridib Sharma, 2003. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 387-390, January.
  7. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  8. Bruce D. Smith & John H. Boyd, 1998. "The evolution of debt and equity markets in economic development," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 519-560.
  9. Williamson, Stephen D., 1986. "Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September.
  10. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October.
  11. John H. Boyd & Bruce D. Smith, 1996. "The use of debt and equity in optimal financial contracts," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 537, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  12. Pietro Reichlin & Paolo Siconolfi, 2004. "Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 75-109, 07.
  13. Mathias Dewatripont, 1989. "Renegotiation and information revelation over time: the case of optimal labor contacts," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9573, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  14. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  15. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, Ivan, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415, May.
  16. Suarez,J. & Sussman,O., 1995. "Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss Economy," Papers, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros- 9518, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
  17. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2000. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement Is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 119-134, January.
  18. Jeffrey Lacker, 2001. "Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 842-859, October.
  19. Charles W. Calomiris & Berry Wilson, 1996. "Bank capital and portfolio management: the 1930s capital crunch and scramble to shed risk," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 521, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  20. Chang, Chun, 1990. "The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 68-86, October.
  21. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
  22. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
  23. Townsend, Robert M., 1988. "Information constrained insurance : The revelation principle extended," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 411-450.
  24. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
  25. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2003. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A Reply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 391-393, January.
  26. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
  27. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Philipp Meyer-Brauns, 2014. "Financial Contracting with Tax Evaders," Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance tax-mpg-rps-2014-01, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  2. Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 407-433, September.
  3. ATTAR, Andréa, 2003. "Financial contracting along the business cycle," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2003069, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-1712. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.