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Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume

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  • ATTAR, Andrea
  • CAMPIONI, Eloisa

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1712.

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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-1712

Note: In : Research in Economics, 57, 315-443, 2003.
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References

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  1. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
  2. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. C. Choe, 1998. "A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 237-255.
  4. Mathias Dewatripont, 1989. "Renegotiation and information revelation over time: the case of optimal labor contacts," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9573, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  5. John Moore & Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, . "Credit Cycles," Discussion Papers 1995-5, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  6. Webb, David C, 1992. "Two-Period Financial Contracts with Private Information and Costly State Verification," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 1113-23, August.
  7. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1998. "Collateralized debt as the optimal contract," Working Paper 98-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  8. Reichlin, Pietro & Siconolfi, Paolo, 2000. "Optimal Debt Contracts and Moral Hazard Along the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 2351, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  10. Jeffrey Lacker, 2001. "Online Appendix to Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract," Technical Appendices lacker01, Review of Economic Dynamics.
  11. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  12. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
  13. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2000. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement Is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 119-134, January.
  14. Tridib Sharma, 2003. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 387-390, January.
  15. John H. Boyd & Bruce D. Smith, 1995. "The evolution of debt and equity markets in economic development," Working Papers 542, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  16. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, Ivan, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415, May.
  17. Williamson, Stephen D., 1986. "Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September.
  18. Townsend, Robert M., 1988. "Information constrained insurance : The revelation principle extended," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 411-450.
  19. Chang, Chun, 1990. "The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 68-86, October.
  20. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2003. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A Reply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 391-393, January.
  21. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
  22. Boyd, John H. & Smith, Bruce D., 1999. "The Use of Debt and Equity in Optimal Financial Contracts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 270-316, October.
  23. Charles W. Calormiris & Berry Wilson, 1998. "Bank Capital and Portfolio Management: The 1930's Capital Crunch and Scramble to Shed Risk," NBER Working Papers 6649, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
  26. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
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Cited by:
  1. ATTAR, Andréa, 2003. "Financial contracting along the business cycle," CORE Discussion Papers 2003069, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 407-433, September.

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