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Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates

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  • AMIR, Rabah
  • EVSTIGNEEV, Igor
  • WOODERS, John

Abstract

This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1650.

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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-1650

Note: In : Games and Economic Behavior, 42, 183-207, 2003
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References

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  1. Rabah Amir & John Wooders, 1998. "Effects of One-way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R&D Cooperation," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics 1998-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  2. Rabah Amir, 2000. "On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1475, Econometric Society.
  3. Salant, S.W. & Shaffer, G., 1997. "Optimal Asymmetric Strategies in Research Joint Ventures," Papers, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory 97-06, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  4. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December.
  5. Amir, Rabah & Wooders, John, 1997. "One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles and Research Joint Ventures," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies 43, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  6. Susan Athey & Armin Schmutzler, 1995. "Product and Process Flexibility in an Innovative Environment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 557-574, Winter.
  7. Lars-Hendrik Röller & Mikhel M. Tombak & Ralph Siebert, 1997. "Why Firms Form Research Joint Ventures: Theory and Evidence," CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) FS IV 97-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Oct 1997.
  8. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1994. "Comparing Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 441-59, June.
  9. D'ASPREMONT, Claude & BHATTACHARYA, Sudipto & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1465, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  11. Greg Shaffer & Stephen W. Salant, 1999. "Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 585-604, June.
  12. Griliches, Zvi, 1990. "Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 28(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
  13. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & BHATTACHARYA, Sudipto & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1356, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," NBER Working Papers 1192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 99s-13, CIRANO.
  16. AMIR, Rabah, 1994. "Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1994013, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. repec:fth:harver:1473 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis, . "Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -823, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  19. Ruff, Larry E., 1969. "Research and technological progress in a cournot economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 397-415, December.
  20. Spence, Michael, 1984. "Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 101-21, January.
  21. Roberts, John & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1976. "On the existence of Cournot equilbrium without concave profit functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 112-117, August.
  22. Athey, Susan & Schmutzler, Armin, 2001. "Investment and Market Dominance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
  23. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Varian, Hal R, 1985. "When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics?," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 715-18, October.
  24. Kamien, Morton I & Zang, Israel, 1993. "Competing Research Joint Ventures," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 23-40, Spring.
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