Rawlsian governments and the race to the bottom
AbstractThis paper argues that there is no race to the bottom when the social planner adopts a Rawlsian criterion, only the poor are mobile and they do not work at the optimal tax outcome. This argument is developed within a two skill-model of optimal income taxation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1649.
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Note: In : Economics Bulletin, 8(2), 1-6, 2002
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Other versions of this item:
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- PIASER, GwenaÃ«l, 2003.
"Labor mobility and income tax competition,"
CORE Discussion Papers, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
2003006, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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"Income Redistribution and Migration,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association,
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- Wildasin, D.E., 1992. "Income Restribution and Migration," Papers, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research 92-003, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2011.
"Strategic Nonlinear Income Tax Competition with Perfect Labor Mobility,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3329, CESifo Group Munich.
- Bierbrauer, Felix & Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2013. "Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 292-311.
- Craig Brett & John Weymark, 2008. "Strategic Nonlinear Income Tax Competition with Perfect Labor Mobility," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0812, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
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