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Social insurance and redistribution

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  • BOADWAY, Robin
  • LEITE-MONTEIR, Manuel
  • MARCHAND, Maurice
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre

Abstract

This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistributive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distortion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Private insurance is available and individuals differ in labor productivity and in loss probability. We show that government intervention in insurance markets is welfare-improving, and social insurance is generally desirable when there is a negative correlation between labor productivity and loss probability.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00446.x
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1643.

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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-1643

Note: In : S. Cnossen and H.-W. Sinn (eds.), Public Finance and Public Policy in the New Century. Cambridge, The MIT Press, 333-358, 2003
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References

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  1. Cremer, H. & Pestieau, P., . "Redistributive taxation and social insurance," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1235, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
  3. Olivia S. Mitchell, 1996. "Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems," NBER Working Papers 5734, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson & William B. Vogt, 1998. "Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second Best in Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 6865, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Dreze, Jean & Stern, Nicholas, 1987. "The theory of cost-benefit analysis," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 14, pages 909-989 Elsevier.
  6. Petretto, Alessandro, 1999. "Optimal social health insurance with supplementary private insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 727-745, December.
  7. Robin W. Boadway, 1994. "The Role of Second-Best Theory in Public Economics," Working Papers 910, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  8. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1991. "Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation," Working Papers 828, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  9. HINDRIKS, Jean & DE DONDER, Philippe, 2001. "The politics of redistributive social insurance," CORE Discussion Papers 2001054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1983. "Moral Hazard and Optimal Commodity Taxation," NBER Working Papers 1154, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Diamond, Peter, 1992. "Organizing the Health Insurance Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1233-54, November.
  12. Arnott,Richard & Atkinson,Anthony B. & Arrow,Kenneth & Drèze,Jacques H. (ed.), 1997. "Public Economics Real Author-Name:Vickrey,William," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521597630, Fall.
  13. Blomqvist, Ake & Horn, Henrik, 1984. "Public health insurance and optimal income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 353-371, August.
  14. Marshall, John M, 1976. "Moral Hazard," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(5), pages 880-90, December.
  15. Pauly, Mark V, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62, February.
  16. Atkinson, Anthony B & Stern, N H, 1974. "Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1), pages 119-28, January.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. BOADWAY, Robin & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Tagging and redistributive taxation," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1932, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Christian Keuschnigg & Evelyn Ribi, 2007. "Outsourcing, Unemployment and Welfare Policy," Working Papers 0720, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
  3. Kifmann, Mathias & Roeder, Kerstin, 2011. "Premium subsidies and social insurance: Substitutes or complements?," hche Research Papers 2011/01, Hamburg Center for Health Economics (hche), University of Hamburg.
  4. Francesca BARIGOZZI, 2006. "Supplementary Insurance with 'ex post' moral hazard: efficiency and redistribution," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 83-84, pages 295-325.
  5. Boadway, Robin & Leite-Monteiro, Manuel & Marchand, Maurice G. & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004. "Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," CEPR Discussion Papers 4253, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Assurance privée et protection sociale," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1832, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Susanna Kochskämper, 2012. "Reformdebatten in der Krankenversicherung vor dem Hintergrund des europäischen Binnenmarktes," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 02/2012, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.
  8. Stéphanie Maillot-Bugnon, 2005. "Assurance maladie et redistribution : le cas de l'arrêt maladie," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 71(4), pages 427-443.
  9. Anil Duman, 2010. "Risks in the labor market and social insurance preferences: Germany and the USA," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 37(2), pages 150-164, January.
  10. Billy Jack, 2003. "Redistributing to the sick: How should health expenditures be integrated into the tax system?," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-16, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.

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