International treaties on global pollution: a dynamic time-path analysis
AbstractIn this paper we show that the formation of coalitions by subsets of countries might diminish the likelihood of a successful world-wide treaty on global pollution. Non-member countries may be less willing to sign a world-wide treaty than they would be in the absence of such coalitions. In fact, the coalition formation may raise the reservation utility of non-member countries above the world-wide treaty level and thus take away their incentives to sign it.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1591.
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Note: In : G. Ranis and L.K. Raut (eds.), Trade, Growth and Development. Essays in Honor of Professor T.N. Srinivasan. Amsterdam, Elsevier Science, 353-361, 1999
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Other versions of this item:
- Parkash Chander, 1998. "International Treaties on Global Pollution: A Dynamic Time-Path Analysis," Economics Working Paper Archive 400, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- CHANDER, Parkash, 1998. "International treaties on global pollution: a dynamic time-path analysis," CORE Discussion Papers 1998054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
- CHANDER, Parkash, 2003.
"The [gamma]-core and coalition formation,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2003046, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- CHANDER, Parkash, . "The gamma-core and coalition formation," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1993, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Parkash Chander, 2004. "The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 108, Econometric Society.
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