Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies
AbstractIf the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for every n. The converse holds under the further assumption of independent private values but not in general, as shown by a counter-example.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1555.
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Note: In : Economic Theory, 18, 349-365, 2001
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Other versions of this item:
- Aviad Heifetz & FranÃ§oise Forges & Enrico Minelli, 2001. "Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 349-365.
- F. Forges & A. Heifetz & E. Minelli, 1999. "Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies," THEMA Working Papers 99-06, THEMA (THÃ©orie Economique, ModÃ©lisation et Applications), UniversitÃ© de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Forges, FranÃ§oise & Heifetz, Aviad & Minelli, Enrico, 2001. "Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5451, Paris Dauphine University.
- Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999. "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. 99-06, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999. "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economies," Papers, Tel Aviv 34-99, Tel Aviv.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
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