Political sustainability and the design of social insurance
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1449.
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Note: In : Journal of Public Economics, 75, 341-364, 2000
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Other versions of this item:
- Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "Political sustainability and the design of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 341-364, March.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Anderberg, Dan, 1999. "Determining the mix of public and private provision of insurance by majority rule," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 417-440, September.
- GOUYETTE, Claudine & PESTIEAU, Pierre, .
"Efficiency of the welfare state,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-1427, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Olivia S. Mitchell, 1998.
"Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems,"
in: Privatizing Social Security, pages 403-456
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Olivia S. Mitchell, . "Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems," Pension Research Council Working Papers 96-4, Wharton School Pension Research Council, University of Pennsylvania.
- Olivia S. Mitchell, 1996. "Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems," NBER Working Papers 5734, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 1998.
"The political economy of targeting,"
Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 177-200, April.
- Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1999. "Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(1), pages 137-157, Spring.
- Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 1996.
"Redistributive taxation and social insurance,"
International Tax and Public Finance,
Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 281-295, July.
- CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1995. "Redistributive Taxation and Social Insurance," CORE Discussion Papers 1995054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Cremer, H. & Pestieau, P., . "Redistributive taxation and social insurance," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1235, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1996. "Industrial policy and politics," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-27.
- Jean-Charles Rochet, 1991. "Incentives, Redistribution and Social Insurance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 16(2), pages 143-165, December.
- Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1996. "Public Provision of Private Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 57-84, February.
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