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Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: an overview

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  • d'ASPREMONT, Claude
  • GERARD-VARET, Louis-André

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1354.

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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-1354

Note: In : Games and Economic Behavior, 25, 311-336, 1998
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References

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  1. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine.
  2. Edward J Green & Robert H Porter, 1997. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1147, David K. Levine.
  3. d'Aspremont, C. & Gerard-Varet, L. -A., 1982. "Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 83-103, June.
  4. Radner, Roy & Myerson, Roger & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69, January.
  5. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
  6. Patrick Legros & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1991. "Efficiency in partnerships," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7044, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  7. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1507-20, September.
  9. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
  10. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1989. "Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 428-442, August.
  11. Johnson, Scott & Pratt, John W & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1990. "Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 873-900, July.
  12. Radner, Roy, 1985. "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1173-98, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Miller, Nolan H. & Pratt, John W. & Zeckhauser, Richard J. & Johnson, Scott, 2007. "Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 476-496, September.
  2. Michihiro Kandori, 2001. "Randomization, Communication and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo CIRJE-F-139, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  3. Pierre Fleckinger, 2007. "On Multiagent Moral Hazard under Technological Uncertainty," Working Papers hal-00240716, HAL.
  4. Fleckinger, Pierre, 2012. "Correlation and relative performance evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 93-117.
  5. Johnson, Scott & Miller, Nolan & Pratt, John W. & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2003. "Efficient Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types, and Interdependent Valuations," Working Paper Series, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government rwp03-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

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