Delaying inter vivos transmissions under asymmetric information
AbstractThis paper develops a model of bequeathing based on a moral hazard type of argument. This model explains why altruistic parents prefer late bequests to early inter-vivos gifts; it also analyzes whether or not they ought to leave rather equal bequests to their children even when the children end up with quite different incomes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1346.
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Note: In : Southern Economic Journal, 65 (2), 322-330, 1998
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- H. Cremer & P. Pestieau, 1998. "Delaying Inter Vivos Transmissions Under Asymmetric Information," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(2), pages 322-330, October.
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