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The consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation

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  • BOADWAY, Robin
  • MARCHAND, Maurice
  • VIGNEAULT, Marianne

Abstract

Tax and expenditure policies are studied in a federation with imperfectly mobile households. States implement a linear progressive tax and supply a public good. A vertical fiscal externality, reflecting the effect of the state policies on federal revenues, provides an incentive to state taxes to be too progressive. A horizontal fiscal externality causes non-optimal states taxes and expenditures of the migration effect. The federal government implements its own linear progressive tax and makes transfers to the states. The federal government implements its own linear progressive tax and makes transfers to the states. The federal government can nullify both externalities by appropriate fiscal policies, and redistributive taxation can be decentralized to the states

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1326.

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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-1326

Note: In : Journal of Public Economics, 68, 453-478, 1998
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  1. Romer, Thomas, 1975. "Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 163-185, February.
  2. Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July.
  3. Wildasin, David E, 1991. "Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 757-74, September.
  4. Johnson, William R, 1988. "Income Redistribution in a Federal System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 570-73, June.
  5. Robin Boadway and Michael Keen, . "Efficiency and the Optimal Direction of Federal-State Transfers," Economics Discussion Papers 445, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  6. Roger H. Gordon, 1982. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," NBER Working Papers 1004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Mansoorian, Arman & Myers, Gordon M., 1993. "Attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 117-132, August.
  8. Myers & G.M., 1989. "Optimality, Free Mobility And The Regional Authority In Federation," Working Papers 10, John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy.
  9. Bewley, Truman F, 1981. "A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 713-40, May.
  10. Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1987. "The economics of the local public sector," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 11, pages 571-645 Elsevier.
  11. Pauly, Mark V., 1973. "Income redistribution as a local public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 35-58, February.
  12. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
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