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Perfect correlated equilibria

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  • DHILLON, A.
  • MERTENS, J.F.

Abstract

The ([ epsilon ] -) perfect correlated equilibria (P.C.E.) are those induced by a ([ epsilon ] -) perfect equilibrium of some correlation device. The "revelation principle" fails for this concept - the direct mechanism may not yield a perfect equilibrium. The approximately perfect correlated equilibria (A.P.C.E.) are the limits of [ epsilon ]-P.C.E., and we obtain a full characterisation for them. Even the A.P.C.E. are "acceptable". We argue on an example that, among those, these are the P.C.E. which seem the "right" concept.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -1197.

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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-1197

Note: In : Journal of Economic Theory, 68 (2), 279-302, 1996
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Cited by:
  1. Viossat, Yannick, 2010. "Properties and applications of dual reduction," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/882, Paris Dauphine University.
  2. MERTENS , Jean-François, 1996. "The limit-price mechanism," CORE Discussion Papers 1996050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Forges, Françoise & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/8159, Paris Dauphine University.
  4. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2008. "Behavioral Properties of Correlated Equilibrium; Social Group Structures with Conformity and Stereotyping," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0814, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  5. Myerson, Roger B., 1997. "Dual Reduction and Elementary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 183-202, October.
  6. Shurojit Chatterji & Srihari Govindan, 2006. "Message spaces for perfect correlated equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 475-479, 06.
  7. Gerardi, Dino & Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 104-134, July.
  8. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.
  9. Viossat, Yannick, 2003. "Properties of Dual Reduction," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/3048, Paris Dauphine University.
  10. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers 827, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Zhigang Cao, 2013. "Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games with suspended realizations of threats," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 337-358, July.
  12. Kam-Chau Wong & Chongmin Kim, 2004. "Evolutionarily Stable Correlation," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 495, Econometric Society.
  13. Zhigang Cao, 2011. "Remarks on Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games," Discussion Paper Series dp565, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  14. Pavlo Prokopovych & Lones Smith, 2004. "Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 287, Econometric Society.

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