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Common ranking and stability of overlapping coalitions

Author

Listed:
  • MAULEON Ana,

    (Université Saint-Louis Bruxelles and CORE)

  • ROEHL Nils,

    (University of Paderborn)

  • VANNETELBOSCH Vincent,

    (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain)

Abstract

Mauleon, Roehl and Vannetelbosch (GEB, 2018) develop a general theoretical framework to study the stability of overlapping coalition settings. Each group possesses a constitution that contains the rules governing both the composition of the group and the conditions needed to leave the group and/or to become a new member of the group. They propose the concept of constitutional stability to study the group structures that are going to emerge at equilibrium in overlapping coalition settings. They combine requirements on constitutions and preferences for guaranteeing both the existence and the emergence of constitutionally stable group structures. In this paper, we show that an alternative way to exclude the ocurrence of closed cycles is to look for constitutions that allow for a common ranking.

Suggested Citation

  • MAULEON Ana, & ROEHL Nils, & VANNETELBOSCH Vincent,, 2018. "Common ranking and stability of overlapping coalitions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2018024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2018024
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2018.html
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    overlapping coalitions; group structures; constitutions; stability; common ranking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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