IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cor/louvco/2014058.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Internal vs. core coalitional stability in the environmental externality game: A reconciliation

Author

Listed:
  • Tulkens, Henry

    (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium)

Abstract

In a game with positive externalities, such as e.g. the standard environmental externality game used in the analysis of international environmental agreements, the solutions having the property of coalitional internal stability, when they exist, are compared in this paper with the solutions with the property of ?-core stability. Key instruments for that comparison are the notions of stable imputations, on the one hand, and on the other, of partial agreement Nash equilibria relative to a coalition as they result from unacceptable, i.e. unstable imputations. The relation between internal and core stable solutions is claimed to be one of compatibility, the former concept complementing the latter in the games where internally stable solutions exist. But this class of games is more restricted than the one for which only ?-core solutions exist. The argument is first presented graphically, then analytically. The relations here exhibited between core and internal forms of stability arouse some concluding thoughts on efficiency, coalitional stability, and on motivations in sharing the surplus generated by cooperation in international environmental issues

Suggested Citation

  • Tulkens, Henry, 2014. "Internal vs. core coalitional stability in the environmental externality game: A reconciliation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014058, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2014058
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2014.html
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 12170, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    2. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 153-175, Springer.
    3. Bréchet, Thierry & Gerard, Francois & Tulkens, Henry, 2007. "Climate Coalitions: A Theoretical and Computational Appraisal," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 10270, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    4. Michael Finus & Alejandro Caparrós (ed.), 2015. "Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15345.
    5. Nick Hanley & Henk Folmer (ed.), 1998. "Game Theory and the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1083.
    6. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    7. Fujita,Masahisa & Thisse,Jacques-François, 2013. "Economics of Agglomeration," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107001411, January.
    8. Germain, Marc & Tulkens, Henry & Magnus, Alphonse, 2010. "Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 208-226, March.
    9. Johan Eyckmans & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Simulating Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 218-249, Springer.
    10. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, Decembrie.
    11. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 176-193, Springer.
    12. Hans‐Peter Weikard, 2009. "Cartel Stability Under An Optimal Sharing Rule," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(5), pages 575-593, September.
    13. Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael & Mallozzi, Lina, 2011. "A New Class of Welfare Maximizing Stable Sharing Rules for Partition Function Games with Externalities," Working Papers 2011/08, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
    14. VAN STEENBERGHE, Vincent, 2004. "Core-stable and equitable allocations of greenhouse gas emission permits," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2004075, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    15. Robert P. Gilles, 2010. "The Cooperative Game Theory of Networks and Hierarchies," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-642-05282-8, July.
    16. Carsten Helm, 2001. "On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(1), pages 141-146.
    17. Hindriks, Jean & Myles, Gareth D., 2013. "Intermediate Public Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262018691, December.
    18. Nordhaus, William D & Yang, Zili, 1996. "A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 741-765, September.
    19. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    20. Nigar Hashimzade & Jean Hindriks & Gareth D. Myles, 2006. "Solutions Manual to Accompany Intermediate Public Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582694, December.
    21. Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson (ed.), 1986. "New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262690934, December.
    22. Roger Guesnerie & Henry Tulkens (ed.), 2009. "The Design of Climate Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262073021, December.
    23. Roger Guesnerie & Henry Tulkens, 2009. "The Design of Climate Policy," Post-Print halshs-00754871, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. KORNEK, Urik & LESSMANN, Kai & TULKENS, Henry, 2014. "Transferable and non transferable utility implementations of coalitional stability in integrated assessment models," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. BRECHET, Thierry & GERARD, François & TULKENS, Henry, 2007. "Climate coalitions: a theoretical and computational appraisal," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2007003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Carraro, Carlo & Bosello, Francesco & Buchner, Barbara & Raggi, Davide, 2003. "Can Equity Enhance Efficiency? Some Lessons from Climate Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3606, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Fuentes-Albero, Cristina & Rubio, Santiago J., 2010. "Can international environmental cooperation be bought?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 202(1), pages 255-264, April.
    5. Marco Rogna, 2016. "Cooperative Game Theory Applied To Ieas: A Comparison Of Solution Concepts," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 649-678, July.
    6. Porchiung Chou & Cheickna Sylla, 2008. "The formation of an international environmental agreement as a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with transferable utilities," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 317-341, December.
    7. Carlo Carraro & Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 379-396, December.
    8. Zili Yang, 2017. "Likelihood of environmental coalitions and the number of coalition members: evidences from an IAM model," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 255(1), pages 9-28, August.
    9. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(4), pages 391-414, December.
    10. Zili Yang, 2016. "Mitigation Cost And Climate Damage Versus Incentive Shifts Of Climate Coalition," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 1-24, November.
    11. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 12170, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    12. Dritan Osmani, "undated". "A note on optimal transfer schemes, stable coalition for environmental protection and joint maximization assumption," Working Papers FNU-176, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University.
    13. Parkash Chander, 2007. "The gamma-core and coalition formation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 539-556, April.
    14. Marc Germain & Philippe Toint & Henry Tulkens & Aart Zeeuw, 2006. "Transfers to Sustain Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 251-274, Springer.
    15. A. Caparrós & J.-C. Péreau & T. Tazdaït, 2004. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 455-480, February.
    16. Michael Finus & Ekko Ierland & Rob Dellink, 2006. "Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 271-291, August.
    17. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2003. "Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0317, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    18. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(4), pages 391-414, December.
    19. Basak Bayramoglu & Jean-François Jacques, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Costly Monetary Transfers," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 745-767, December.
    20. Johan Eyckmans & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Simulating Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 218-249, Springer.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    environmental externalities; game theory; coalitions; core; internal stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2014058. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alain GILLIS (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/coreebe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.