Rock and roll bands, (in)complete contracts and creativity
AbstractMembers of a rock and roll band are endowed with different creativity. They match and eventually obtain credit for song writing as well as a share of the returns from sales. More creative members increase the probability of success but may also claim a larger share of the pie. In our theoretical model, the nature of matching (postive or negative assortative) as well as the covariation between the probability of having a “hit” and the dispersion of credits given to individual members are a function of the completeness of contracting. When members adopt a “gentleman’s agreement” to share credits equally, the covariation between the probability of a hit and the dispersion of credits is negative, which is the consequence of positive assortative matching in creativity. The data show that the relation between dispersion and success is significantly negative, and that rock bands are thus likely to sign incomplete contracts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2010074.
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2010
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overlapping generations; resource management; common pool resource; spatial interdependence; strategic behaviour; cooperative behaviour;
Other versions of this item:
- Cedric Ceulemans & Victor Ginsburgh & Patrick Legros, 2011. "Rock and Roll Bands, (In)complete Contracts, and Creativity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 217-21, May.
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CUL-2011-02-12 (Cultural Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-02-12 (Game Theory)
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