Hospital Þnancing systems determine ma jor decisions made by physicians and managers within hospitals. This paper examines the impact of the transition toward an activity-based reimburse- ment system that has emerged in most OCDE countries. We consider two initial situations, one for a private for-proÞt sector where both hospitals and physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis and the other for a public sector under prospective budget and salaried physicians. For the private sector, our model focuses on the type of interaction (simultaneous, sequential or joint decision-making games) that should emerge between agents after the introduction of the activity-based Þnancing system. In the public sector, the elasticity of the demand to the level of inputs seems to play a more crucial role in the transition.
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number
2006029.
Find related papers by JEL classification: I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
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