International R&D collaboration networks
AbstractWe reconsider Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez [Rand J. of Econ. 32 (2001), 686-707] model of strategic networks in order to analyze how government policies (e.g. subsidies) will affect the stability and efficiency of networks of R&D collaboration among three firms located in different countries. A conflict between stability and efficiency is likely to occur. When governments cannot subsidize R&D, this conflict will occur if public spillovers are not very small. However, when governments can subsidize R&D, the likelihood of a conflict is considerably reduced. Indeed, a conflict will arise only if public spillovers are very small or quite large.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2005040.
Date of creation: 00 Jun 2005
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networks; R&D collaboration; subsidy;
Other versions of this item:
- SONG, Huasheng & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, . "International R&D collaboration networks," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2042, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Huasheng, SONG & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH, 2005. "International R&D Collaboration Networks," Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques) 2005035, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
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