Credit market failures and policy

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Credit market failures and policy

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MINELLI, Enrico
MODICA, Salvatore

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Enrico Minelli

Abstract

In a simple model of the credit market, based on Stiglitz-Weiss (1981), equilibria are computed and optimal policies to correct market failures are characterized. Some widely applied policies, notably interest-rate subsidies and investment subsidies, are compared to theoretical optimum, and an alternative optimal policy is described which we argue is more robust to model misspecification. An insight on the trade-off between credit policy and infrastructural investment is also offered. A discussion of some aspects of regional policy in Italy's Mezzogiorno is finally presented as an application of the analysis.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2003093.

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Date of creation: 01 Dec 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2003093

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Article
- Enrico Minelli & Salvatore Modica, 2009. "Credit Market Failures and Policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(3), pages 363-382, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Enrico Minelli & Salvatore Modica, 2006. "Credit Market Failures and Policy," Working Papers ubs0607, University of Brescia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick & Matthews, Steven A, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 3487, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," Penn CARESS Working Papers dfdfbbfe0a5b0e04217a58a93, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 890-930, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mankiw, N Gregory, 1986. "The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 455-70, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- N. Gregory Mankiw, 1986. "The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse," NBER Working Papers 1786, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
de Meza, David & Webb, David C, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 281-92, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
C. Choe, 1998. "A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 237-255. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Amedeo Fossati & Rosella Levaggi, 2008. "Delay is not the answer: waiting time in health care & income redistribution," Working Papers 0801, University of Brescia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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