Wage bargaining and vertical differentiation
AbstractThis article intends to apply the Nash Bargaining solution to wage setting in a vertically differentiated oligopoly and to study its welfare effects. The market outcome crucially depends on the bargaining power attributed to the agents. I show that the resulting wage bargaining structure is likely to lead to another source of distortion that adds to the classical one derived by oligopoly pricing and quality choice.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2002076.
Date of creation: 00 Dec 2002
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vertical differentiation; workers’ skills; wage bargaining; welfare;
Other versions of this item:
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- J00 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - General
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