The procedural value
AbstractWe propose a single-valued solution that extends both the consistent Shapley value of Maschler and Owen (1989) and Raiffa's discrete bargaining solution to a large class of NTU games. Though not axiomatized, the solution is motivated via the Nash program. In this respect, we follow an approach that is similar to the one initiated by Hart and Mas-Collel (1996).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2002016.
Date of creation: 00 Sep 2002
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- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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