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A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies

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  • ALBANO, Gian Luigi
  • GERMANO, Fabrizio
  • LOVO, Stefano

Abstract

In an example with two objects and four bidders, some of which have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential, the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions.

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File URL: http://alfresco.uclouvain.be/alfresco/download/attach/workspace/SpacesStore/c6f2e42a-0de4-4e00-b2f5-38f9a28b9cfc/coredp_1999_52.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1999052.

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Date of creation: 01 Oct 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1999052

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References

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  1. Peter Cramton, 1998. "Ascending Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98eer, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 28 Jul 1998.
  2. Milgrom, Paul, 1998. "Putting auction theory to work : the simultaneous ascending auction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1986, The World Bank.
  3. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, 09.
  4. Krishna, V. & Rosenthal, R.W., 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Papers 04-95-06, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  5. Robert W. Rosenthal & Ruqu Wang, 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values," Papers 0060, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  6. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998.
  7. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
  8. Branco, Fernando, 1997. "Sequential auctions with synergies: An example," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 159-163, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Dakshina G. De Silva & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005. "The Impact Of Change In Auction Format On Bidding Behavior," Microeconomics 0512009, EconWPA.
  2. Gian Albano & Fabrizio Germano & Stefano Lovo, 2006. "Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-8, April.
  3. Lunander, Anders & Lundberg, Sofia, 2011. "Do Combinatorial Procurement Auctions Lower Cost? - An Empirical Analysis of Public Procurement of Multiple Contracts," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 825, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
  4. Chernomaz, Kirill & Levin, Dan, 2012. "Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 611-635.
  5. Zheng, Charles Z., 2012. "Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 648-664.
  6. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Pagel, Beatrice & Peeters, Ronald, 2012. "The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs," DICE Discussion Papers 54, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  7. LOVO, Stefano & ALBANO, Gian Luigi & GERMANO, Fabrizio, 2002. "On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects," Les Cahiers de Recherche 765, HEC Paris.

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